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Humans and other animals can adapt their social behavior in response to environmental cues including
the feedback obtained through experience. Nevertheless, the effects of the experience-based learning of
players in evolution and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma games remain relatively
unclear. Some previous literature showed that mutual cooperation of learning players is difﬁcult or
requires a sophisticated learning model. In the context of the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma, we
numerically examine the performance of a reinforcement learning model. Our model modiﬁes those
of Karandikar et al. (1998), Posch et al. (1999), and Macy and Flache (2002) in which players satisﬁce if
the obtained payoff is larger than a dynamic threshold. We show that players obeying the modiﬁed
learning mutually cooperate with high probability if the dynamics of threshold is not too fast and the
association between the reinforcement signal and the action in the next round is sufﬁciently strong. The
learning players also perform efﬁciently against the reactive strategy. In evolutionary dynamics, they
can invade a population of players adopting simpler but competitive strategies. Our version of the
reinforcement learning model does not complicate the previous model and is sufﬁciently simple yet
ﬂexible. It may serve to explore the relationships between learning and evolution in social dilemma
situations.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Human beings and other animals often cooperate with each
other even in social dilemma situations where to not cooperate is
apparently a rational choice. A standard framework in which
social dilemma situations are studied is the Prisoner’s dilemma
game (PD) and its variants. Many theoretical mechanisms for
emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma
games have been reported thus far (Axelrod, 1984; Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010).
Most of these mechanisms do not deal with the adaptation or
learning of individuals. We use the term learning to refer to
individual learning (i.e., experience-based adaptation), but not to
social learning (i.e., imitation). Learning implies that an individual
takes advantage of the history of the games that it has played to
perform better in subsequent rounds. A learning individual
changes behavior on the basis of some statistics of the game
results. Laboratory experiments suggest that humans do learn
during sequences of games (Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al.,atical Informatics, The Uni-
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BY-NC-ND license.2009). The learning of the social behavior of animals, including
humans, has been modeled in various game and non-game
situations (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Cross, 1983; Boyd
and Richerson, 1985; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer,
2003).
Learning in a game is relevant only in an iterated game. It is
well known that mutual cooperation can be optimal in the
iterated PD (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984). Action rules that have
mainly been considered in the context of the iterated PD are those
that do not adjust conditional probabilities of cooperation upon
experience. A player using a look-up table that relates the next
action to the outcome of the game in the current and past few
rounds belongs to this class (Axelrod, 1984; Kraines and Kraines,
1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993; Nowak,
1990; Lindgren, 1991; Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010). This impor-
tant class includes well-known strategies such as the tit-for-tat
(TFT). However, the ﬂexibility of such a strategy appears to be
limited.
Players using reinforcement learning, on which we focus in this
study, exploit information about past encounters to adapt the
probability of cooperation conditioned by the outcome of the game
in a couple of past rounds. Because of their ﬂexibility, such learning
players may be strong competitors in the iterated PD. If learning
players compete relatively well in a population, the learning
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through evolutionary dynamics. Nevertheless, the possible roles
of reinforcement learning in the iterated PD, either in favor of or
against the promotion of cooperation, are relatively unexplored. In
fact, players using reinforcement learning have generally been
unsuccessful in the PD and other social dilemma games (Macy,
1996; Sandholm and Crites, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Taiji and
Ikegami, 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002; Masuda and Ohtsuki,
2009). Although an artiﬁcial neural network model, for example,
enables mutual cooperation (Gutnisky and Zanutto, 2004), such a
complicated mechanism may not be implemented by humans or
other animals. It seems that the current understanding of social
dilemmas is mostly based on studies in the ﬁelds of evolutionary
biology and economics. Because experience-based learning, and
reinforcement learning in particular, is quite evident in humans
and other animals, both in terms of behavior and neural activities
(Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al., 2009), clarifying the role of
reinforcement learning in the iterated PD may provide an addi-
tional understanding of how subjects cope with social dilemmas.
In the present study, we numerically examine a variant
of the reinforcement learning model (Karandikar et al., 1998;
Posch et al., 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002) in the iterated PD.
Following Macy and Flache (2002), we call the original model the
Bush–Mosteller (BM) model. A player obeying the BM reinforce-
ment learning (BM player for short) would continue an action
(i.e., cooperate or defect) after gaining a relatively large payoff
and would switch the action otherwise. If the threshold payoff
above which the player satisﬁces, which is called the aspiration
level, is ﬁxed, BM players can mutually cooperate (Rapoport and
Chammah, 1965; Macy, 1991, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Macy and
Flache, 2002; Izquierdo et al., 2007, 2008). The BM player with the
ﬁxed aspiration level studied in these articles is essentially the
same as Pavlov that only uses the information about the immedi-
ate past (Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993).
Pavlov is known to be exploited by the unconditional defector and
behave too generously to the unconditional cooperator.
Real subjects may adapt the aspiration level in response to the
results of the game (Simon, 1959). The BM model with the
adaptive aspiration level is not known to yield a large probability
of mutual cooperation except in some limited cases (Karandikar
et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002). We
remark that performance of other reinforcement learning models
with the adaptive aspiration level have also been investigated in
the PD and other games (Pazgal, 1997; Kim, 1999; Palomino and
Vega-Redondo, 1999; Dixon, 2000; Bo¨rgers and Sarin, 2000;
Oechssler, 2002; Bendor et al., 2003; Napel, 2003; Cho and
Matsui, 2005). In the temporal difference learning, which is a
dominant form of reinforcement learning in the brain, dopamine
neurons represent the difference between the obtained reward
and the dynamic expected reward that changes according to the
subject’s experience (Schultz et al., 1997; Montague and Berns,
2002; Daw and Doya, 2006; Glimcher et al., 2009). The reinforce-
ment signal in the BM model with the adaptive aspiration level is
given by the difference between the obtained reward and the
dynamically changing aspiration level such that the BM model
with the adaptive aspiration level is at least loosely connected to
neural evidence.
We show that a simple modiﬁcation of the BM model with the
adaptive aspiration level drastically changes the behavior of the
player. The modiﬁed BM player mutually cooperates with a large
probability and is competitive in evolutionary dynamics. The mod-
iﬁcation is done such that the reinforcement signal is reﬂected to the
action selection in the next round fairly strongly. The aspiration
level must adapt with a low to intermediate learning rate for
sustaining cooperation. It should be noted that our modiﬁcation to
the BM model does not introduce an additional complexity to theoriginal BM model with the adaptive aspiration level (Karandikar
et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002).2. Model
We consider the symmetric two-person PD whose payoff
matrix is given by
C D
C
D
R S
T P
 
, ð1Þ
where T4R4P4S and R4ðTþSÞ=2. The entries of Eq. (1) repre-
sent the payoffs that the row player gains. Each row (column)
corresponds to the action of the row (column) player, i.e., coopera-
tion (C) or defection (D). Because T4R and P4S, mutual defection
is the only Nash equilibrium of the single-shot game. Unless
otherwise stated, we assume a standard payoff matrix for the PD
given by R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, and P¼1.
A pair of players play the PD for a predetermined number of
rounds denoted by tmax. We denote the round by t (¼1, 2, y).
Although the Nash equilibrium of the iterated PD is defection in
all the rounds, which can be derived by backward induction, we
assume for simplicity that players do not carry out backward
induction. We could avoid this technical subtlety by assuming
that a next round occurs with a certain probability such that the
last round is not known beforehand (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak,
2006).
To model a learning player, we use a variant of the BM
reinforcement learning model adapted to the game situation,
pioneered in Rapoport and Chammah (1965). Our model is a
variant of the BM model with the adaptive aspiration level
(Karandikar et al., 1998; Posch et al., 1999; Macy and Flache,
2002).
In round t, the BM player intends to cooperate with probability pt.
We set the initial condition to p1¼0.5. In addition, we assume that
the player misimplements the action (i.e., C or D) to play the opposite
action with a small probability e. The payoff that the BM player gains
in round t is denoted as rtAfR,T ,S,Pg. We deﬁne the stimulus, or the
reinforcement signal, using the sigmoidal function as
st ¼ tanh½bðrtAtÞ, ð2Þ
where At is the aspiration level in round t above which the BM player
satisﬁces. The degree of satisfaction is parametrized by st, and
1osto1 holds true. If st40 (sto0), the BM player is motivated
to keep (switch) the current action in the next round. The sensitivity
of the stimulus to the reinforcement signal rtAt is parametrized by
bZ0.
The dynamics of the probability of cooperation are given by
ptþ1 ¼
ptþð1ptÞst ðAction in round t¼ C, and stZ0Þ,
ptþptst ðAction in round t¼ C, and sto0Þ,
ptptst ðAction in round t¼D, and stZ0Þ,
ptð1ptÞst ðAction in round t¼D, and sto0Þ:
8>><
>>:
ð3Þ
Finally, the dynamics of the aspiration level are given by
Atþ1 ¼ ð1hÞAtþhrt , ð4Þ
where h represents the learning rate of the aspiration level, which is
also called habituation (Macy and Flache, 2002). In contrast to
previous models in which h decays as t increases (Erev and Roth,
1998; Cho and Matsui, 2005), we assume that h is a ﬁxed constant.
Unless otherwise stated, we set the initial value of At to
A1¼(RþTþSþP)/4, which is equal to the expected payoff when
there are an equal number of cooperators and defectors in a
population. As a remark, the possibility of cooperation in the iterated
PD and other games was examined when the update of At is driven
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the maximal experienced payoffs (Pazgal, 1997), or the payoff
averaged over the population (Palomino and Vega-Redondo, 1999;
Oechssler, 2002).
The difference between our model and the Macy–Flache model
(Macy and Flache, 2002) lies in Eq. (2). Macy and Flache use
st ¼ ‘ðrtAtÞ=max½TAt ,AtS instead of Eq. (2). As described
below, this difference results in a remarkable difference in the
behavior of the player. In other words, we show that reacting
strongly to the play in the previous round (i.e., large b) is
necessary for mutual cooperation. A deterministic decision maker
with the adaptive aspiration level used in Posch et al. (1999)
corresponds to b¼1. We numerically show that b does not have
to be extremely large for mutual cooperation. We remark that, if
b¼1 and the aspiration level is ﬁxed (i.e., h¼0), the strategy is a
win-stay lose-shift one. In particular, our BM model with b¼1
and h¼0 is equivalent to the Pavlov strategy (Kraines and Kraines,
1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) if PoAtoR.3. Results
3.1. BM versus BM
In this section, we examine the performance of a BM player
playing against another BM player. We assume that the two
players employ the same values of b and h. For a range of b and
h, the fraction of the rounds in which the focal BM player
cooperates is shown for three values of implementation error,
e¼ 0, 0.01, 0.1, and two values of the number of rounds, tmax¼100,
1000, in Fig. 1. The presented values are averages over 100 trials in
this and the following ﬁgures unless otherwise stated. The fraction
of cooperation is large when h is small and b is large. The results
are fairly robust, despite some degradation, even under 10% of the
error in the action implementation (Fig. 1(c, f)). Remarkably, a largeFig. 1. Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM player. The
of the misimplementation of the action is equal to (a, d) e¼ 0, (b, e) e¼ 0:01, and (c, ffraction of cooperation can be established only after tmax¼100
rounds (Fig. 1(d–f)). These results are in contrast to those for other
reinforcement learning models for social dilemma games, where
the establishment of mutual cooperation requires a large number
of rounds (Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2009) or is simply difﬁcult (Macy,
1996; Sandholm and Crites, 1996; Posch et al., 1999; Taiji and
Ikegami, 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002; Masuda and Ohtsuki,
2009).
In Fig. 1, b must be larger than approximately 2.7 for the
fraction of cooperation to be large for small h. When b is in this
range, Eq. (2) suggests that the reinforcement signal st would be
typically close to 1 or 1 before a possible equilibrium is reached.
This is because jrtAtj is typically about unity or larger when
R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, and P¼1. Then, Eq. (3) implies that pt is close to
0 or 1, and the selection of the action tends to be almost
deterministic. This deterministic nature of the BM player seems
to pave the way to mutual cooperation. This result is consistent
with those obtained from other models of reinforcement learning
with the adaptive aspiration level (Palomino and Vega-Redondo,
1999; Oechssler, 2002).
Some mutual cooperation also occurs in the Macy–Flache
original BM model with the adaptive aspiration level (Macy and
Flache, 2002). For the sake of comparison, the fraction of coopera-
tion in the Macy–Flache model with e¼ 0 and tmax¼1000 is
shown in Fig. 2 for various values of h and the sensitivity to the
stimulus ‘. The fraction of cooperation is much smaller than that
for our model. We consider that this is because the stimulus st
with which to update the probability to cooperate in the next
round is not sufﬁciently sensitive to the reinforcement signal
rtAt in the Macy–Flache model. To satisfy 1rstr1 such that
Eq. (3) is well deﬁned, we need ‘r1. Then, st would not be close
to 1 or 1 in a considerable number of rounds. Then, the action in
the next round is not likely to be very sensitive to the result of the
game in the current round. Regardless of the value of ‘, Macy’s
model roughly corresponds to our model with a small value of b.number of rounds is equal to (a–c) tmax¼1000 and (d–f) tmax¼100. The probability
) e¼ 0:1. We set R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, and P¼1, and vary h and b.
Fig. 2. Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM player
in the Macy–Flache model. We set tmax¼1000, e¼ 0, R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, and P¼1,
and vary h and ‘.
Fig. 3. Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM
player. We set tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, b¼ 3, c¼1, R¼bc, T¼b, S¼c, and P¼0, and
vary h and b/c.
Fig. 4. Fraction of cooperation of the BM player playing against another BM
player. We set tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, b¼ 3, R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, and P¼1, and vary
h and A1.
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b yields a small fraction of cooperation in our model (Fig. 1).
Our results are also consistent with those in Posch et al.
(1999), in which the authors analytically showed that mutual
cooperation is difﬁcult when h¼1 and b¼1 (their YESTERDAY
strategy) and that mutual cooperation is established if the
temptation payoff T is not too large when h is tiny and b¼1
(their FARAWAY strategy). A sufﬁciently small h combined with
slight stochasticity in the dynamics of h also leads to mutual
cooperation (Karandikar et al., 1998). Our numerical results
extend their analytical results in showing that the BM players
mutually cooperate up to an intermediate value of h if b is
sufﬁciently large.
To test the robustness of the results against changes in the
payoff matrix, we set R¼bc, T¼b, S¼c, and P¼0, and measure
the fraction of cooperation as a function of h and the beneﬁt-to-
cost ratio b/c. We set b¼ 3, for which the BM player mutually
cooperates when R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, P¼1, and h is small (Fig. 1). The
results for tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, and c¼1 are shown in Fig. 3.
The cooperation decreases with an increase in h. Nevertheless, the
threshold value of b/c above which the BM players mutually
cooperate with a probability close to unity differs only slightly up
to h 0:25.
A small h requires a relatively large number of rounds before
the cooperative equilibrium is reached, even if the parameter
values are set to yield a cooperative equilibrium. The fraction of
cooperation when tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, b¼ 3, R¼3, T¼5, S¼0,
and P¼1 is shown in Fig. 4 for various values of h and initial
aspiration level A1. Fig. 4 suggests that h40:03 is necessary for h
to relax to an equilibrium value within tmax¼1000 rounds. When
h is too small, the fraction of cooperation strongly depends on A1.
If PoA1oR, the BM player is essentially the same as Pavlov for
such a small h. In this case, mutual cooperation is realized,
reﬂecting the fact that Pavlov cooperates against itself (Kraines
and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). However, if we
start from a different A1, the fraction of cooperation would be
small for a small value of h.
Two BM players may have different parameter values.
Because Fig. 4 suggests that the value of A1 is irrelevant to the
fraction of cooperation unless h is too small, we set
A1¼(RþTþSþP)/4 and examine the case in which two players
have different values of h and b. We set h¼0.3 and b¼ 3 for a
focal BM player. For the opponent BM player with the identicalvalues of h and b, Figs. 1 and 3 guarantee that the two players
mutually cooperate. With tmax¼1000 and e¼ 0:02, the fraction
of cooperation and the mean payoff for the focal player when
the opponent has different values of h and b are shown
in Fig. 5(a) and (b), respectively. Fig. 5(a) indicates that the focal
BM player mostly cooperates with the opponent with similar
values of h and b. Although the fraction of cooperation is small
when the opponent has small b, the focal BM player avoids being
exploited by the opponent in this way (Fig. 5(b)). In both cases,
the focal BM player performs well against the BM opponent.
3.2. BM against reactive strategies
We examine the behavior of the BM player against players
adopting the reactive strategy. A reactive strategy is an often used
non-learning strategy, and it is speciﬁed by two parameters p and
q (p,qA ½0,1) and the initial condition. The reactive player
cooperates with probabilities p and q when the opponent coop-
erates and defects in the previous round, respectively (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1989, 1992; Nowak, 2006). Unconditional cooperation
Fig. 5. Behavior of a focal BM player with h¼0.3 and b¼ 3 against a BM opponent with different values of h and b. (a) Fraction of cooperation and (b) mean payoff of the
focal BM player. We set tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, R¼3, S¼0, T¼5, and P¼1.
Fig. 6. Fraction of cooperation of (a) BM player, (b) TFT, and (c) GTFT against reactive strategies. We set tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, h¼0.3, b¼ 3, R¼3, S¼0, T¼5, and P¼1.
Mean payoff of (d) BM player, (e) TFT, and (f) GTFT against reactive strategies.
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(p,q)¼(1,1), (0,0), and (1,0), respectively. We assume that a player
with the reactive strategy cooperates in the ﬁrst round.
The fraction of cooperation of the BM player against various
reactive strategies is shown in Fig. 6(a) for tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02,
h¼0.3, and b¼ 3. The BM player rarely cooperates with ALLC and
ALLD. To never cooperate is the optimal action against these two
strategies. The BM player cooperates with TFT in approximately half
the rounds. This is not an optimal behavior; perpetual cooperation is
optimal when the opponent is TFT (Axelrod, 1984). The mean payoff
for the BM player against the reactive strategy is shown in Fig. 6(d).
For all the values of p and q, the mean aspiration level of the BM
player is indistinguishable from the mean payoff shown in Fig. 6(d).
As already implied in Fig. 6(a), the BM player exploits ALLC and gains
more than 4.5 per round. The BM is not exploited by ALLD and gains
approximately P¼1 per round. The BM player gains approximately
2.5 per round against TFT. This value is smaller than but not too far
from R¼3 per round, which would be obtained by mutual coopera-
tion with TFT. Fig. 6(a) shows that the BM player cooperates with a
large probability with generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) deﬁned by p¼1 and
q¼1/3 for the current payoff matrix. GTFT is a strong competitor in
the iterated PD (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). Although the BM playeroccasionally defects against GTFT, the BM player gains  R¼ 3 per
round, which would be obtained by mutual cooperation.
The BM player does not play optimally against TFT. However,
the BM player is generally strong against reactive strategies, as
compared to TFT and GTFT. To support this, we plot the fraction of
cooperation and the mean payoff for TFT against the reactive
strategy in Fig. 6(b) and (e), respectively. The plotted values are
analytical solutions obtained by Nowak and Sigmund (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1989, 1990; Nowak, 1990, 2006), which are summar-
ized in Appendix for completeness. As shown in Fig. 6(b), TFT does
not cooperate with itself because TFT is intolerant to haphazard
defection of the opponent (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). In addi-
tion, TFT does not exploit ALLC. This is why TFT is eventually
invaded by ALLD in evolutionary simulations in which ALLC,
ALLD, and TFT coexist (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992, 1993). The
payoff for TFT against the reactive strategy (Fig. 6(e)) is smaller
than that for the BM player (Fig. 6(d)) for a wide range of p and q.
This is particularly true for large values of p, which encompass
TFT, GTFT, and ALLC.
The fraction of cooperation and the mean payoff for GTFT
player against the reactive strategy are shown in Fig. 6(c) and (f),
respectively (see Appendix for derivation). The GTFT player
Fig. 7. Time courses of evolutionary dynamics. We set tmax¼1000, e¼ 0:02, h¼0.3, b¼ 3, R¼3, T¼5, S¼0, and P¼1. (a) Results for N¼2585, m¼3, and 44 types of
memory-one strategies. (b) Results for N¼2617, m¼5, and 64 types of memory-one strategies.
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GTFT is too generous to ALLC and ALLD. When p and q are both
small or both large, the payoff for GTFT (Fig. 6(f)) is smaller than
that for the BM player (Fig. 6(d)). In addition, the payoff for GTFT
and that for the BM player are comparable when q4p and when
(p,q) is close to that of GTFT. On the basis of these numerical
results, we conclude that the performance of the BM player
against the reactive strategy is comparable to that of GTFT.
3.3. Evolutionary simulations
If the BM player is a strong competitor in the iterated PD, it
should be able to evolve in a population in which different
strategies coexist. To examine this point, we simulate evolution-
ary dynamics of populations where BM players and non-learners
coexist in the beginning. We model non-learners by the stochastic
memory-one strategy with which the player determines an action
based on its own action and that of the opponent in the previous
round (Nowak et al., 1995).
There are four types of outcomes of the pairwise interaction
in a round, i.e., CC, CD, DC, and DD. The ﬁrst and second letters
(i.e., C or D) represent the actions of the focal player obeying the
memory-one strategy (memory-one player for short) and the
opponent, respectively. The memory-one player is parametrized
by the action in the ﬁrst round and four probabilities pCC, pCD, pDC,
and pDD. The probability corresponding to the outcome of the
present round is used as the probability that the memory-one
player cooperates in the next round. For example, if both players
cooperate, the memory-one player cooperates with probability
pCC in the next round. Initially, the memory-one player is
assumed to cooperate with probability pCC. The memory-one
strategy includes many important strategies such as the reactive
strategy and Pavlov (Nowak et al., 1995). We assume pCC, pCD, pDC,
pDDAf0,1=m,2=m, . . . ,ðm1Þ=m,1g and that there are initially an
equal number of memory-one players of each type. The casem¼3
with a slight modiﬁcation is employed in a previous study
(Hauert and Stenull, 2002). To be realistic, we assume that both
the memory-one player and the BM player misimplement the
intended action with probability e¼ 0:02.
We denote the number of players in the population by N. Each
player in the population plays against each of the other N1 players
iteratively for tmax¼1000 rounds in a single generation. The results
shown in the following are qualitatively the same if tmax is reduced to
500. We normalize the payoff of each player by dividing it by
(N1)tmax such that the payoff per generation falls between S and
T. We update the strategy of the players during evolutionary
dynamics according to the Fermi rule (Szabo´ and T+oke, 1998;
Traulsen et al., 2006). At the end of each generation, we pick a pair
of players i and j from the population with equal probability. We
denote their single-generation payoffs as r(i) and r(j). With probability1=½1þexpð ~bðrðiÞrðjÞÞÞ, player i copies the strategy of player j. With
the remaining probability, player j copies the strategy of player i. We
set ~b ¼ 1. If the parent (i.e., player whose strategy is copied) is the BM
player, the child (i.e., player copying the strategy of the parent)
becomes the BM learner. In this case, both the parent and the child
start with pt¼1¼0.5 and At¼1¼(RþTþSþP)/4 in the next generation.
If the parent is a memory-one player, the child inherits the parent’s
parameter values pCC, pCD, pDC, and pDD. For simplicity, we do not
consider mutations.
To examine the possibility that the BM player invades a
population of players with various memory-one strategies, we
start evolutionary simulations with 1% of the BM players in a
population. Two time courses of typical runs when h¼0.3 and
b¼ 3 are shown in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7(a), we set m¼3 and prepare 10
memory-one players of each of the 44¼256 types and 25 BM
players in the beginning. Therefore, N¼2560þ25¼2585. In
Fig. 7(b), we set m¼5 and prepare two memory-one players of
each of the 66¼1296 types and 25 BM players in the beginning.
Therefore, N¼2592þ25¼2617. In both cases, the BM players can
invade the population of memory-one players to eventually
become dominant. Within the memory-one players, those with
large pCC tend to survive at early stages of evolutionary dynamics
before they are overwhelmed by the BM player.4. Discussion
We numerically analyzed the behavior of a BM model in the
iterated PD. Our model is a modiﬁcation of the BM model used
by Macy and Flache (2002) such that the probability of coopera-
tion in the next round is made sensitive to the reinforcement
signal obtained in the current round. Our model is also a close
variant of the models used by Karandikar et al. (1998) and Posch
et al. (1999). When the adaptation of the aspiration level is not
too fast, the modiﬁed BM player mutually cooperates with a large
probability. The BM player also performs efﬁciently against
reactive strategies and in evolutionary dynamics in a population
comprising various memory-one strategies. Up to our numerical
efforts, the results are robust against the error in the action
implementation and the change in the payoff matrix describing
the PD.
The BM player performs at least comparably to memory-one
players such as GTFT and Pavlov, which are strong competitors in
the iterated PD. Although the BM player is inferior to these
strategies when playing against TFT, it performs better than GTFT
against other strategies including ALLC and ALLD. In an evolu-
tionary context, naively cooperating with ALLC allows it to
prosper by a neutral drift, which eventually invites the invasion
of malicious players such as ALLD. Therefore, it is important to be
able to exploit ALLC for a strategy to survive in evolutionary
N. Masuda, M. Nakamura / Journal of Theoretical Biology 278 (2011) 55–62 61dynamics (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). This property is not
satisﬁed by TFT (Axelrod, 1984), GTFT (Nowak and Sigmund,
1992), Pavlov (Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund,
1993), and BM model with a ﬁxed aspiration level (Macy, 1991,
1996; Posch et al., 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002). In contrast, our
BM player as well as the temporal difference learner (Masuda and
Ohtsuki, 2009) are capable of exploiting ALLC.
As a model of humans and other animals in iterated games, a
learning strategy may be generally disadvantageous as com-
pared to simpler learning strategies and non-learning strategies
in at least two aspects. First, the number of rounds before
learning is established may be large. For example, the temporal
difference learning, a type of reinforcement learning, must be
implemented with a very small learning rate to realize mutual
cooperation (Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2009). In contrast, the learn-
ing of the modiﬁed BM model is completed in one to some
hundreds of rounds. This speed of learning is comparable to that
of other learning models in which mutual cooperation is
obtained within ten to hundred rounds (Macy, 1991, 1996;
Erev and Roth, 1998, 2001; Hauert and Stenull, 2002; Macy
and Flache, 2002). Second, humans or other animals subjected to
social dilemma situations may not implement a complex learn-
ing strategy. In this aspect, the BM model with the adaptive
aspiration level, both the original ones (Karandikar et al., 1998;
Posch et al., 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002) and ours, has a clear
advantage. The BM model is simpler than many learning models
including the temporal difference learning (Sandholm and Crites,
1996; Masuda and Ohtsuki, 2009), ﬁctitious play (Erev and Roth,
1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer, 2003), genetic
algorithms (Macy, 1996), and artiﬁcial neural networks (Macy,
1996; Sandholm and Crites, 1996; Taiji and Ikegami, 1999;
Gutnisky and Zanutto, 2004).
The memory-one strategy, for example, can be regarded as a
reinforcement learning because the probability of cooperation is
a function of the outcome in the previous round. This is also the
case for analogous strategies with longer memory (Lindgren,
1991). Nevertheless, in this study, we are concerned with the
cases where the probabilities of cooperation conditioned by the
recent results of the game adapt over time. In the case of the BM
model, adaptation is realized by the dynamic aspiration level.
Learning players in this restricted sense cope with various types
of opponents more ﬂexibly than the memory-one strategy or its
extension with longer memory. For example, we showed that the
mean aspiration level of the BM player is almost equal to the
mean payoff against different reactive strategies (Section 3.2).
This result indicates that the BM player ﬂexibly behaves as
different types of win-stay lose-shift strategists depending on
the opponent. Learning in games is a recent outstanding issue
involving interdisciplinary research ﬁelds such as behavioral
game theory and neuroeconomics (Fudenberg and Levine,
1998; Camerer, 2003; Glimcher et al., 2009). Because the effect
of learning is evident in laboratory experiments (Camerer, 2003;
Glimcher et al., 2009), it may be important to consider individual
learning in addition to evolution to understand the behavior of
agents, particularly that of humans, in social dilemma situations.
Our model, which is simple yet competitive in the PD, may be
used for examining various problems with regard to relation-
ships between learning and cooperation in social dilemma
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When the focal player obeys the reactive strategy with para-
meters p and q, the long-term behavior of the focal player against
the reactive strategy with parameters p and q can be analytically
calculated (Nowak and Sigmund, 1989, 1990; Nowak, 1990,
2006). The probability that the focal player cooperates is given by
s1 ¼
qðpqÞþq
1ðpqÞðpqÞ : ð5Þ
The mean payoff of the focal player is given by
Rs1s2þSs1ð1s2ÞþTð1s1Þs2þPð1s1Þð1s2Þ, ð6Þ
where s1 is given by Eq. (5) and
s2 ¼
qðpqÞþq
1ðpqÞðpqÞ : ð7ÞReferences
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